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Hungary’s 2011 constitutional reform also brought along the reform of the election
system as a whole. The new constitution (Fundamental Law) extended the right to
vote to all Hungarian citizens, irrespective of their country of residency (Article XXIII),
and corresponding legal rules were enacted to make the acquisition of citizenship
easier for Hungarians living abroad. The whole-scale election reform was complete
with the introduction of a new central (national) voter registry. To be eligible to vote
in the next national election, citizens were meant to individually apply to be listed
in the central registry before the elections. The new central registry was meant
to replace the old system, used since 1990, where the national list of voters was
compiled automatically, via transferring voters’ names from the national population
and residency databases.
The government communicated the election reform as a strong policy preference
and defended the idea of conditioning the rights to vote on prior registration in the
face of massive political and academic criticism. In order to make way for the new
election rules parliament amended the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental
Law on November 9, 2012 to add a provision on prior registration as a precondition
to the right to vote.  The bill on the election reform was then passed on November
26, 2012. The president of the republic refused to sign the election bill into law and
referred several provisions for preliminary review before the Constitutional Court.
In its first decision of the new year of January 7, 2013 the Constitutional Court
agreed with the president of the republic and found the challenged provisions of
the election bill, among them the rules on the central voter registry, unconstitutional
[Decision 1/2013 (I. 7) AB]. This decision was indeed prepared by the Constitutional
Court’s last decision of 2012, finding key articles in the Transitional Provisions of the
Fundamental Law unconstitutional upon the request of the ombudsman [45/2012
(XII. 29.) AB]. Among the provisions invalidated in December 2012 the Constitutional
Court included the amendment introducing the constitutional basis of the application
based central voter registry. Together these two decisions signal a timely and most
welcome awakening of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.
Lately the turn of the year has been formative for Hungarian constitutionalism.
While the new Hungarian constitution, the Fundamental Law was signed into law
on Easter Monday of 2011, right before its entry into force on January 1, 2012
parliament added a set of Transitional Provisions to it in the latest days of business
in December 2012. These Transitional Provisions included not only a two-page
long condemnation of communism but also additional provisions to expand the new
Fundamental Law. In order to clarify the constitutional status of the Transitional
Provisions, parliament enacted the First Amendment to the Fundamental Law on
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June 18, 2012. According to this amendment the Transitional Provisions form part of
the Fundamental Law.
The ombudsman challenged the constitutionality of the Transitional Provisions
before the Constitutional Court. In a 10-to-5 decision of late December 2012 the
Constitutional Court found that those provisions in the Transitional Provisions and
in subsequent amendments which contain additional substantive constitutional
rules were enacted in excess of the constitutional delegation of power to enact
transitional provisions to the new Fundamental Law are invalid. The Constitutional
Court refused to see the Transitional Provisions and their subsequent amendment
as a constitutional amendment or as an addition to the Fundamental Law. The
substantive articles of the Transitional Provisions were found ultra vires for their
temporal scope as well as for their subject matter.
According to the Constitutional Court the new Fundamental Law was meant to be a
lasting and complete foundation of the Hungarian legal system. This is reflected in
the postamble of the Fundamental Law which refers to the new constitution as “the
first unified Fundamental Law of Hungary.” With enacting the Transitional Provisions
right before the entry into force of the new Fundamental Law, then amending the
Fundamental Law in June 2012 to incorporate the Transitional Provisions and then
amending the Transitional Provisions (with an amendment the title of which refers to
the Fundamental Law) on elections in November 2012 parliament generated serious
uncertainty as to what constitutes the body of the constitution. This uncertainty was
regarded as a violation of the principle of the rule of law [Article B(1), Fundamental
Law].
The Constitutional Court also noted that Transitional Provisions amounted to a
limitation on the constitutionally established jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court
itself and were not acceptable as such. The Court emphasized that under the new
Fundamental Law it was the constitutional responsibility of the Court to protect the
unity of the constitution, and to ensure that the text of the constitution can be clearly
identified. The justices added that an amendment of the constitution cannot create a
unresolvable inconsistency in the text of the constitution.
Accordingly, the amendment of the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law
of November 9, 2012 which made the right to vote dependent on prior individual
application to be included in a central voter registry was found invalid by the
Constitutional Court. When the president of the republic referred the new election
bill for preliminary review to the Constitutional Court in November 2012, he certainly
could not expect the decision of the Constitutional Court to make his case so easy.
The president’s petition against the election bill requested the Constitutional Court
to assess whether the prior registration requirement was a proportionate limitation of
the right to vote.
In another 10-to-5 decision the Constitutional Court found that lacking a
constitutional foundation for an application-based central voter registry, the necessity
of application requirement had to be assessed as a permissible limitation of the right
to vote. The Constitutional Court found that although the Fundamental Law extends
the right to vote to non-resident citizens [Article XXIII], this change does not require
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an application process for resident citizens. The Constitutional Court repeatedly
emphasized that as far as citizens residing in Hungary are concerned, voters are
accounted through data from the population and residency registers, therefore an
individual application procedure is redundant.
The January 2013 decision of the Constitutional Court on the election bill was
not a major surprise following the December decision on the unconstitutionality
of the Transitional Provisions which essentially removed the constitutional basis
of the reform. It was still rather unfortunate how it was openly rumored in the
press that the government knew about the essence of the decision weeks before
the Court announced it. It still came a surprise mixed with relief when a senior
government politician announced in response to the decision of the Constitutional
Court that although the government could reinstall the constitutional basis of the
prior registration regime with a constitutional amendment right away, it decided not to
pursue this avenue for the time being.
Beyond the immediate words of these two decisions, first, it is a most welcome
development that the Constitutional Court spoke up in no uncertain terms about its
disapproval of the frequent constitutional amendments of 2011 and the numerous
adjustments to the new constitution. In the December 2012 decision the Court noted
that many provisions included in the new constitution did not pertain to constitutional
issues at all. The Court’s concern for the unity of the constitution and for the integrity
of its own jurisdiction resonates particularly soundly against this background.
Indeed, the Constitutional Court emphasized the obligation the constitution maker
to observe requirements of the rule of law and legal certainty when exercising its
constitution making powers. The Court set several constitutional criteria even when
it note that parliament is certainly free to reenact the invalidated provisions as an
amendment to the Fundamental Law itself.
Secondly, in these decisions the current majority of the Constitutional Court
provided ample guidance on how they situate the new Fundamental Law against
the constitutional corpus of the past 20 years. It is very clear that the Court is split
on this issue. Dissenters in the voter registration case placed much emphasis on
the need to redefine the right to vote in terms of the new relationship of rights and
responsibilities as enshrined in the new constitution. They would also have preferred
a strong emphasis on the communal aspect of the right to vote in preserving national
identity in terms of the National Avowal.
In contrast, the majority preferred to strongly rely on the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court as developed under the old, 1989 Constitution. E.g. in a smaller
issue the justices made it clear that while the new Fundamental Law does not have a
provision on respect for equal dignity of human beings, the new provision on equality
before the law [Article XV(1)] has to be read as a formulation of the requirement of
non-discrimination as treating persons as subjects of equal dignity, as developed in
the prior jurisprudence of the Court. Similarly, in the decision on the constitutionality
of the Transitional Provisions, speaking up against the uncertainty of the text of the
constitution, the Court noted that the level of protection afforded to constitutional
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values and guarantees under the new Fundamental Law cannot be lower than as
established under the previous Constitution.
Lastly, while in these last two decisions the Constitutional Court clearly grappled with
the government, it appears that the Court is not without an audience and not without
allies in the public square. Access to the Constitutional Court is more limited than
before, when actio popularis was the main avenue of challenging unconstitutional
legislation. As the newly introduced constitutional complaints take time to trickle
down the hierarchy of ordinary courts, the ombudsman and the president of the
republic – at least for the time being – inhabit an even more precarious watchdog
function. Thus, those with standing before the court are as an important audience of
constitutional arguments as the justices themselves. So far the stakeholders of these
debates seem to be mindful of their transformed professional and communicative
positions.
As if to offer some reassurance and even encouragement, in these last decisions
the Court appears to signal that the justices are mindful of their broader domestic
and international audience, and are keen to speak the language of European
constitutionalism. References to the opinions of the Venice Commission and
European human rights jurisprudence are certainly not new from the Hungarian
Constitutional Court. The Court’s analysis of foreign law and jurisprudence may be
read as a reaffirmation of the commitment to hold the new Hungarian constitution
and its operators to the standards of European constitutionalism. Continued
conversations on these standards may assist the Court in its upcoming decisions.
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